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I.
A.

ARGUMENT

THE SHARPS HAVE CONCEDED THAT THE JUDGMENT
IMPERMISSIBLY COMPOUNDS INTEREST. THIS COURT
SHOULD ENTER AN ORDER THAT WHITE PINE PREVAILED
ON APPEAL WITH RESPECT TO THIS ISSUE.

In their opening brief filed on August 27, 1990, White Pine
explained in detail how the Judgment as supplemented by the Amended
Order re: Defendants' Second Motion to Supplement Judgment and
Motion to Increase Liability on Bond, entered by the district court
on May 14, 1990 (the "Amended Order"), contrary to law, provides
for the compounding of interest.

1

White Pine's Brief ("WPB") at

12-14.

Although

the

Sharps

have

denied

the

Judgment

(as

supplemented) provides for compound interest, they admit that on
November

9,

1990 —

five months after White Pine

filed this

appeal —

they filed a motion in the district court to "amend" the

Amended Order so the Judgment would not bear compound interest.
Sharps' Brief ("SB") at 9-11 and Addendum thereto at 85-86.
By Minute Entry dated December 18, 1990 (the "Minute Entry"),
the district court granted the Sharps' motion to amend the Amended
Order to avoid the compounding of interest.

A copy of the Minute

Entry is included in the Addendum hereto at "A".

Even though the

district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the
motion or make the Minute Entry,1 there is no question that by
filing the motion, the Sharps conceded the Judgment provided for
compound interest just as White Pine has contended in this appeal.
The Sharps would have this Court believe White Pine just
seized on some minor, technical problem that is now resolved by the
Minute Entry. That suggestion is wrong for several reasons: First,
White Pine specifically raised the compounding-of-interest problem

Due to the pendency of this appeal, the district court
unquestionably lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the
motion to amend the Amended Order or make the Minute Entry. See,
§ II hereof, infra. Since no order has yet been entered by the
district court, no appeal has yet been lodged by White Pine with
respect to the granting of that motion. Nonetheless, there is no
question that the Sharps conceded that the Judgment and the Amended
Order, contrary to law, provided for compound interest.
2

in more than one objection filed with the district court.

Twice

in conjunction with this appeal White Pine explained the problem
to the Sharps:

once when the Sharps sought to have this appeal

summarily dismissed; again in White Pine's Brief after the Sharps'
motion for summary dismissal was denied.

WPB at 8-11.

Second, rather than simply telling this Court they conceded
the issue, it is apparent White Pine, following this appeal, sought
a modification of the Judgment in the district court to avoid a
declaration that White Pine was the prevailing party with respect
to this issue.

Because of the third issue in this appeal —

awarding of attorney's fees to the prevailing party —

the

it is

obvious that such a declaration has significant implications for
the

Sharps.

Accordingly, this Court

should

enter

an order

reversing the district court's entry of the Judgment (as amended)
to the extent it compounds interest.

Doing so would avoid the

necessity of yet a third appeal in this case.
B.

THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE HAS NO APPLICATION TO
THIS CASE.

There are two reasons why this Court should not invoke the
"mootness" doctrine. First, that doctrine provides that an appeal
is moot when the present controversy between the parties is ended
and "the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the
litigants."

Burkett v. Schwendiman, 773 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 1989).

3

See, also, Duran v. Morris, 635 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah 1981).
judicial policy

represented

by the mootness

reluctance of appellate courts against
opinion,"

doctrine

The

is the

"rendering an advisory

Black v. Alpha Fin. Corp., 656

P.2d

409, 410-11

(Utah 1982).
In this case, the present controversy between the parties is
far from ended.

The Utah Supreme Court has granted White Pine's

Petition for Certiorari, see, 150 U.A.R. 28, and all the issues
contained in White Pine's first appeal to this Court will now be
considered by the Utah Supreme Court.

Moreover, now that the

district court has taken it upon itself to lift its previously
imposed stay, White Pine is faced with the ongoing threat of the
Sharps' presentation of yet another motion or order to the district
court seeking to lift the stay in this matter.
Second, even if the mootness doctrine were properly applied
in this case, which it is not, there are numerous, established
exceptions to that doctrine. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Reynolds, 788
P.2d 1044, 1045-46 (Utah App. 1990).

One such exception exists

when an issue "is of wide concern, affects the public interest,
[and] is likely to recur in a similar manner, . . . "

Ld. at 1046

(quoting In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1371 (Utah 1982) (quoting
Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1981)).

4

No issue is any more fundamental to the orderly administration
of justice than whether a court has the freedom to grant relief
that was never requested, never argued, and never explicitly ruled
upon.
C.

THE DISTRICT COURT WAS POWERLESS TO LIFT THE
PREVIOUSLY IMPOSED STAY.

Point III of the Sharps' Brief, contained at pp. 12-18,
addresses White Pine's argument at pp. 19-20, that the district
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to lift or revoke the stay.
Nowhere in the pages the Sharps devote to this issue do they
present any authority holding or even suggesting that a district
court has the power to lift or revoke a previously imposed stay.2
The clear and explicit holding of In re Fed. Facilities Realty
Trust, 227 F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 1955), that district courts have no
power to revoke stays, is not challenged by any of the cases cited
by the Sharps.

Moreover, as pointed out at p. 19 of White Pine's

initial Brief, the Seventh Circuit there interpreted a federal rule
functionally identical to Utah R. Civ. P. 62(d).

2

Porter v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. App. 790, 248 P.1077 (App.
1926), cited by the Sharps at p. 14 of their Brief, contains
language suggesting a district court does have this authority. An
examination of Porter, however, plainly discloses that case was
decided pursuant to a wholly different statutory and regulatory
scheme than exists in Utah, and that the case is not applicable
here.
No other case cited by the Sharps even addresses the
question of vacating, lifting, terminating or revoking an existing
stay.
5

The Sharps argue, however, that in some way Utah R. App. P.
8(a) abrogates the clear holding of Federal Facilities.
not so.

This is

Rule 8(a) provides, in part, that a party may apply "for

approval of a supersedeas bond, or for an order suspending,
modifying, restoring or granting an iniunction during the pendency
of an appeal . . . "

(emphasis added).

Rule 8(a) is explicit:

A

district court is free to suspend or modify an injunction, but is
empowered only to approve a supersedeas bond.

By its express and

unambiguous language, Rule 8(a) is consistent with the holding of
Federal Facilities that "the order purporting to vacate the stay
in a cause already on appeal was void ab initio, and that the stay
continued in effect."

Id. at 656 (emphasis added).

Accordingly, this Court should explicitly confront this issue
and rule that district courts have no power to lift, revoke, or
vacate existing stays.3
D.

ONCE THE DISTRICT COURT SET THE INITIAL BOND,
IT WAS POWERLESS TO ESTABLISH A NEW BOND AMOUNT
OR TO MODIFY THE JUDGMENT IN THE WAY IT DID.

The Sharps rely on the case of Osborn v. Riley, 331 So.2d 268
(Ala.

1976) for the proposition that a trial court is free to

3

At p. 21 of their Brief, the Sharps seem to imply that
either this Court or the Utah Supreme Court has in some way
passively approved the district court's lifting of the stay. This
is incorrect.
Neither court has ever expressed any opinion
whatsoever on the propriety of the district court's unrequested,
unargued and unbriefed lifting of the stay in this case.

6

increase a bond amount at any time.

This expansive reading of

Osborn is not justified by its facts.

In Osborn, the trial court

entered an ex parte Order on May 21 setting the supersedeas bond
at $5,000.00.

Seven days later, on May 28, the Rileys filed a

Motion to increase the amount of the supersedeas bond based on
their contention the initial amount was inadequate. On June 6, the
trial court modified its earlier decree and increased the amount
from $5,000.00 to $20,000.00.

See, id. at 270.

The Alabama

Supreme Court affirmed this modification because it was done during
"the 30-day grace period during which the cause remained xwithin
the breast of the court'." Id. at 273 (quoting, Ward v. Blackwell,
269 Ala. 632, 634, 115 So.2d 41, 42 (1959)).
The White Pine case, however, does not involve a question of
a trial court's immediate modification of an initial bond amount
obtained ex parte.

Rather, it concerns the district court's

authority to order a modification many months later after all
appellate briefing of the initial order had been completed and only
shortly before oral argument was held.

Accordingly, Osborn is

clearly distinguishable.
In re Long, 93 B.R. 791 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1988), also cited by
the Sharps, has nothing to do with this case, and is apparently a
mis-citation by the Sharps.

The immediately preceding case in

Volume 93 of the Bankruptcy Reporter, Matter of Ridgemont Apt.
7

Assoc, Ltd-, 93 B.R. 788 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988) does, however,
address the question at hand.

Once again, Ridgemont does not

support the Sharps' position because it addressed Bankruptcy Rule
8005 which specifically grants a bankruptcy court the right to
modify its own orders, Id. at 790. Similarly, Venen v. Sweet, 758
F.2d 117 (3rd Cir. 1985) only permits a district court to modify
injunctions, a procedure expressly authorized by Rule 8(a).
In short, none of the Sharps' authorities directly stands for
the proposition that a district court has any pow€*r even to modify,
much less to lift, revoke or vacate a stay once it has been
entered.
E.

THE DISTRICT COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION TO ENTER
THE AMENDED ORDER•

Assuming that the Sharps intended to cite Ridgemont rather
than

Long

(a

safe

assumption

since

the

Sharps

quoted

from

Ridgemont), Ridgemont stands for exactly the opposite proposition
argued by the Sharps.

The Ridgemont court held it did have the

authority pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 8005 to modify a stay it had
issued because such a modification would address "not the Order
already on appeal, but the bond required as a condition of the stay
pending appeal."

Ici.

At the same time, however, the Ridgemont

court specifically agreed "that it cannot modify an Order after
jurisdiction over the appeal of the Order vests in the district

8

court. . . . "

Ld. This is precisely the rule stated by White Pine

at pp. 22-23 of its initial Brief.
Just as Ridgemont supports White Pine's position, none of the
cases relied on by the Sharps provides persuasive authority to the
contrary.
For example, in Finst Dev. v. Bemaor, 449 So. 2d 290 (Fla.
Dist.

Ct.

App.

1983),

the

trial

court

expressly

reserved

jurisdiction to establish attorneys' fees and costs. Jd.

This is

directly contrary to the language in the district court's initial
judgment in this case whereby the Sharps were to be awarded
attorneys' fees only "after prevailing in any appeal."

(R. 2183).

Moreover, in Finst, the attorneys' fees and costs awarded were
pursuant to the primary judgment because of the reservation. That
case did not involve additional fees and costs incurred in addition
to fees and costs already awarded.
Dent v. Simmons, 61 Md. App. 122, 485 A.2d 270 (App. 1985)
similarly involved the award of attorneys' fees in the first
instance,

not

additional

and

supplemental

attorneys'

fees.

Although the appellate court found this award proper, it wrote that
the better practice in most cases would be to determine
those issues before judgment becomes final on the case
in chief, in order to avoid successive appeals . . .
Indeed, the decision of the appellate court on the
matters in chief may even vitiate the basis for an award
of counsel fee. Under those and possibly other circumstances, it may be wiser for the trial judge to defer
9

determining the issue of attorney's fees until after the
completion of the appellate process.
Id. at 274.
Thus, the best case the Sharps can find is one that reluctantly permitted the trial court to award attorneys' fees for the first
time, but not supplemental attorneys' fees as obtained by the
Sharps in this case.

The Maryland court enunciated sound policy

reasons why even this was not a good practice.
Those reasons apply with special force in this case. The Utah
Supreme Court has granted White Pine's certiorari petition, and the
propriety of even the initial award of attorneys' fees is in limbo.
Because of the district court's actions in this case, White Pine
has been forced to file another appeal addressing attorneys' fees
the initial award of which may well never be affirmed by the
Supreme Court. As recognized by the Dent court, this is a wasteful
process which should not be encouraged.
No Utah case has ever permitted the supplementation of a
judgment of the sort performed by the district court in this case.
White v. State of Utah, 137 U.A.R. 3 (Utah 1990), approved only a
reduction in a judgment to reflect an accounting reality.
approving

only a reduction, that

historical fact.

10

amendment merely

Besides

recognized

For all the foregoing legal and policy reasons, this Court
should specifically hold the district court was without subject
matter jurisdiction to supplement its Order in the manner it did.
F.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES
WAS IMPROPER.

As demonstrated by the foregoing, the district court's award
of attorneys' fees was premature.

Beyond that, however, it was

procedurally improper, and its reversal is required.
Nowhere in their Brief do the Sharps contradict, distinguish
or even address the authorities set forth on pp. 26-27 of White
Pine's initial Brief. Those cases require a district court to make
specific findings of fact and conclusions of law where attorneys'
fees are not awarded as prayed for in a parties' request for fees.
It is undisputed in this case that the district court reduced the
Sharps' requested supplemental attorneys' fees by approximately
$25,000.00 and awarded them nearly $80,000.00 in fees, all without
any findings whatsoever. The Sharps do not anywhere in their Brief
dispute that this failure by the district court requires a remand.
See, Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah App. 1990) (when
a district court awards attorneys' fees in an amount less than
requested, it must identify such factors on the record in order to
permit meaningful review on appeal); Matter of Estate of Grimm, 784
P.2d 1238, 1249 (Utah App. 1989) (the absence of findings and

11

conclusions on the issue of attorneys' fees compels remand to the
trial court to correct that deficiency in the record) .

This error

is serious, because this court has no way of determining on appeal
why certain fees were awarded and certain ones were not, or if the
attorneys' fees awarded were reasonable.
II.

CONCLUSION

Because of the district court's legal errors, its Order should
be reversed* The district court awarded compound interest contrary
to the

longstanding

and universal

prohibiting such an award.

rule

in this

jurisdiction

The legal error was not corrected when

the district court later acted without jurisdiction to correct it.
The district court also committed error when it revoked and lifted
a previously granted stay when that remedy was never properly
requested, never briefed or argued and, in any event, not within
the authority of the court to grant.

The district court again

committed reversible legal error when it entered its approval of
the Sharps' disputed attorneys' fees without making any findings.
In addition, the court erred when it entered these orders without
subject matter jurisdiction to do so.

This Court, in remanding

this case to the district court, should instruct that court that
White Pine was the prevailing party on all issues appealed,
including the compounding of interest issue.

12

DATED:

January
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, 1991.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
WHITE PINE RANCHES
PLAINTIFF
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SHARP, JOHN C.

CASE NUMBER 870901621 CV
DATE 12/18/90
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK JAB
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TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY.
D. ATTY.

AFTER REVIEW OF THE PLEADINGS AND UPON RECEIPT OF THE
NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION FILED DECEMBER 5, 1990 AND THE
REQUEST FOR HEARING FILED DECEMBER 5, 1990 THE COURT RULES AS
FOLLOWS:
1. DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO AMEND AMENDED ORDER IS GRANTED
FOR THE REASONS SPECIFIED IN THE MOVING PAPERS.
2. COUNSEL FOR MOVANTS IS TO PREPARE THE ORDER.
3. DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR HEARING ON THEIR CROSS MOTION
FOR SANCTIONS PER RULE 11 IS DENIED.
4. THE MATTER WILL BE RULED ON PER RULE 4-501 C.J.A.

